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Abstract. This paper demonstrates the incentives for an oligopolist to
obfuscate by deliberately increasing the cost with which consumers can locate its
product and price. Consumers are allowed to choose the optimal order in which to
search rms and rms are able to inuence this order through their choice of search
costs and prices. Competition does not ensure market transparency - equilibrium
search costs are positive and asymmetric across rms. Intuitively, an obfuscating
rm can soften the competition for consumers with low time costs by inducing the
remaining consumers to optimally rst search its rival.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the strategic incentives for an oligopolist to obfuscate by increasing the
cost at which consumers can locate its product and price. In contrast to the standard logic
of perfect information disclosure (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981), the paper demonstrates
a mechanism whereby an individual rm can protably soften competition by committing
to increase its cost of being searched. In equilibrium, rms vary in their provision of
information such that search costs are positive and asymmetric.
As one application, the paper can help understand why a single rm, Direct Line,
decided to withdraw from all price comparison sites in the UK car insurance market.
Contrary to the popular explanation of lowering commission costs, commentators have
suggested such savings would have been far outweighed by the costs that followed from
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the rms decision to heavily advertise its withdrawal. Instead, the choice of Direct
Line to publicly commit to increasing the time required for consumers to locate its prices
while maintaining a low-price strategy appears consistent with the obfuscation mechanism
documented in this paper1 . More generally, the insights of the paper can be applied to a
range of contexts. They can provide a reason for why some rms may be unwilling to pay
for prominent positions in search engine results or directories2 , why some rms locate in
obscure locations, or why rms can vary in their advertising intensity and content.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, by showing that positive, asymmetric
search costs may be the outcome of an endogenous market process, it adds support to
the importance of search models, but o¤ers some concern over the frequency with which
such models assume that search costs are symmetric across rms (e.g. Varian 1980, Stahl
1989 and Janssen and Moraga-González 2004). Second, to analyse these issues, the paper
makes an original step by allowing consumers to choose not only the number of rms to
search, but also the order in which to search them. Several recent models have stressed
the signicance of search order, but assume that the order is either exogenous (Arbatskaya
2007, Armstrong et al 2009), or based on relative advertising levels (Haan and Moraga-
González 2009)3 . Here, the paper allows consumers to choose their optimal search order
and lets rms inuence this order through their choice of search costs and prices.
Specically, the model considers a homogenous good duopoly where consumers either
have positive or zero per-unit costs of time. In a rst stage, rms select the length of time
required to locate their product and price. In a second stage, their decisions becomes
common knowledge and the rms then choose prices while consumers decide the extent
and order with which they wish to search the rms. If the time required to locate products
and prices is assumed to be non-zero and equal across rms, as within standard search
1Statements about Direct Lines withdrawal decision can be read, together with
statements about its price strategy, such as Direct Line o¤ers a range of dis-
counts and product innovations that are aimed at achieving one thing  bringing
down the cost of car insurance, at http://www.directline.com/motor/welcome.htm and
http://www.directline.com/motor/newimprovedcar.htm respectively, 20 April 2009. For the com-
mentatorsviews, see The Economist, 7 February 2009, p.32.
2Athey and Ellison (2008) incorporate consumer search into a model where rms bid for a search
engines sponsored link positions. Their assumptions of exogenous product quality and positive search
costs for all consumers rule out any obfuscation results related to this paper.
3 In a related vein, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) demonstrate that asymmetric sampling probabilities
are useful in explaining pricing patterns in the mutual funds industry.
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models, the rms employ identical mixed-strategy pricing distributions in order to resolve
the tensions produced by the consumer heterogeneity. When, however, rms are allowed
to pre-commit to the time required to locate their products and prices, an equilibrium
exists where one rm obfuscates and where the other, now prominent, rm does not.
Intuitively, the act of obfuscation by any given rm induces (the majority of) con-
sumers with positive time costs to optimally rst search its rival and makes them less
willing to make a second search. This increases the rivals incentives to raise its price
(distribution) and benets the obfuscating rm by softening the competition for the re-
maining consumers with zero time costs. The prominent rm faces no incentive to raise
its search cost in addition to its rival as this can only reduce its prots by deterring
consumers from entering the market. Nor does the prominent rm face any incentive to
counter the obfuscating rms strategy by providing consumers with information about
its rival because the obfuscation raises both rmsprices and prots (while decreasing all
consumersexpected surplus).
After demonstrating how the incentive to obfuscate can extend to situations where
there is some minimum level of market friction or more than two rms, the nal section
of the paper explores the models two central assumptions. The rst of these involves the
ability of consumers to observe the length of time required to locate each rms product
and price before making their search decisions. For example, in many everday circum-
stances, consumers can be aware of the location of each rmsstore or website and yet
still need to make a costly visit to learn either rms price. If one weakens such an as-
sumption, the role of optimal search order can no longer be studied as consumers must
then view the rms as ex ante identical. However, we proceed to show how obfuscation
can remain an equilibrium phenomenon when consumers only observe the rmsdecisions
imperfectly. The second central assumption involves the ability of rms to pre-commit to
an obfuscation strategy. This assumption is shown to be crucial within the model. With-
out it, a no-obfuscation equilibrium exists where an increase in search costs is incapable of
inducing higher rival prices and simply prompts consumers to search and buy elsewhere.
Consequently, the model is best applied to the use of longer-run decision variables such
as location or certain forms of advertising. In alternative market scenarios where these
assumptions may not apply so readily, Ellison and Wolitzky (2008) show how obfuscation
can exist if one makes some additional modelling assumptions. In a recent and indepen-
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dent piece of work, they demonstrate the possibility of two obfuscation mechanisms that
both di¤er to this paper within a one-stage framework where consumers do not observe
search costs such that search order is not an important issue. Their results are further
discussed in Section 5.
The wider literature dates back to a pioneering paper by Bakos (1997) which em-
phasised the possibility that rms have an incentive to soften competition by collectively
increasing search costs4 . More recently however, the literature stemming from Ellison
and Ellison (2009) has focused on understanding whether the incentives to obfuscate can
extend to the level of an individual rm. The mechanism presented in this paper di¤ers
from previous ndings in several key respects5 .
First, the incentive to obfuscate is driven by strategic rather than cost factors. Janssen
and Non (2008) present a model of advertising that one can interpret in terms of obfusca-
tion. In a duopoly game where advertising and pricing decisions are simultaneous, rms
can either engage in costly advertising to reduce search costs to zero or maintain positive
search costs by choosing not to advertise (obfuscate). They nd that a pure-strategy zero
search cost equilibrium cannot exist because the resulting Bertrand competition would
generate an incentive to refrain from costly advertising. However, as advertising costs
tend to zero, this incentive to obfuscate vanishes, and the probability that equilibrium
search costs are zero tends to one. In our model, rms can select any level of search costs
at zero cost.
Second, the incentive to obfuscate does not rely on consumersbounded rationality.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) present an equilibrium where all rms obfuscate by shrouding
a high price for an add-on good. A fraction of myopic consumers do not foresee the
existence of add-ons and compare rms only on the basis of observable base prices alone.
This leads rms to protably conceal high add-on prices and cross-subsidise low base good
prices6 . In our model, all consumers are fully rational.
4Carlin (2008) studies a model where individual obfusction has the implicit e¤ect of increasing all
rmssearch costs such that the fraction of informed consumers shrinks. Firms obfuscate with positive
probability in equilibrium.
5Aside from providing an insightful discussion, Ellison and Ellison (2009) use data from the online
computer memory market to document how rms use low quality products to maniuplate search engine
results and to provide evidence for Ellison (2005), see below.
6 In a related paper, where rms are presented with the option to set hidden fees on top of observable
prices, Garrod (2007) shows that, if some consumers are naive, no equilibrium exists where all rms
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Third, the incentive to obfuscate does not rely on the existence of add-on goods.
Ellison (2005) o¤ers a model where rational consumers are of either high or low type,
with high types being less likely to switch between rms and more willing to purchase
add-ons. The concealment of add-on prices acts to soften competition due to an adverse
selection e¤ect where rms are deterred from reducing base prices by the possibility of
attracting a disproportionate amount of low-types who only buy the base good at a below
optimum price. Our model uses a standard, single good framework.
Most closely related to the current paper are the results of Ireland (1993) and Zettelmeyer
(2000) who both allow rms to pre-commit to strategies that inuence the cost at which
consumers can obtain information. In Ireland, each rm pre-commits to informing a pro-
portion of consumers of the rms existence. Consumers may only buy from rms that
they are aware of (at zero cost). In equilibrium, only one rm chooses to inform the entire
market. In Zettelmeyers duopoly model, consumers observe prices but must search to
discover their rm-specic product match value as a draw from an exogenous, symmetric
distribution. Example parameters can be chosen such that only one rm pre-commits
to zero search costs. While this framework simplies the analysis of consumerssearch
decisions  consumers simply rst search the rm with the lowest search cost - it also
makes the equilibrium analysis intractable for a general set of parameters. By allow-
ing consumers to search over endogenous price distributions, our framework provides a
tractable equilibrium analysis and o¤ers a more meaningful and fuller investigation of
optimal search order.
The paper continues by outlining the model in Section 2 and analysing its equilibria in
Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 investigates the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
Let there be two rms, i = 1; 2; that each sell a single homogeneous good at zero produc-
tion costs to a unit mass of fully rational consumers who each have a unit demand and
a maximum willingness to pay of V > 0: In order to buy from rm i; it is assumed that
a consumer must necessarily incur si units of time searching for the location of rm is
product and price. Consumers vary in their per-unit cost of time and remain indistin-
guishable to rms. In particular, an extreme form of consumer heterogeneity is introduced
commit to zero fees.
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by assuming that a proportion of consumers,  2 (0; 1); labelled as costly-shoppers, have
a positive cost of time that is normalised to unity, and the remaining proportion of shop-
pers,  = 1 ; have a zero cost of time (or enjoy shopping) such that they always choose
to search. Consequently, while costly-shoppers face a search cost for rm i equal to si,
shoppers always face zero search costs.
Consider the following two-stage game. In Stage 1, each rm simultaneously selects
its own search cost, si; by choosing the length of time required to locate its product and
price7 . To ensure that the results are not inuenced by any cost motivations, it is assumed
that rms may inuence their own search costs at zero cost. Firms are free to select any
non-negative level of search costs, si  0.
In Stage 2, each rms choice of search cost becomes common knowledge. The players
then choose the following strategies simultaneously. Firms select their own (possibly
degenerate) pricing distribution, Fi(p); with support [pi; pi]; from which a price is drawn,
pi; and the two types of consumers form conjectures about the rmspricing strategies
(which are correct in equilibrium) and select their optimal search strategies. It is assumed
that consumers can search the rms sequentially with costless recall. Consequently, a
search strategy must prescribe the conditions under which a consumer should make a rst
search, the conditions under which a consumer should stop searching, and in an important
contrast to standard symmetric models, the order in which the consumer should search
the rms.
3. Stage 2 Analysis
3.1. Optimal Search Strategies. This section begins to analyse Stage 2 by con-
sidering consumersoptimal search strategies for a given set of search costs and pricing
strategies: While the optimal behaviour of the shoppers simply involves buying from the
rm with the lowest price realisation (if lower or equal to V ), and randomising in the case
of a price tie, the costly-shoppersoptimal search strategy is more complicated. To charac-
terise their optimal search strategy, we rely on Weitzman (1979) which presents the solu-
tion to a generalised dynamic search problem akin to the one considered here. His results
imply that the costly shoppersoptimal search strategy can be simplied to three rules
7One may wish to think of interpretations other than time. Instead, consumers could di¤er, say, in
their cost of e¤ort and rms would then choose the e¤ort required to nd their product and price.
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that are based on the rmsreservation prices. As in standard search problems, the reser-
vation price of rm i, ri ; is dened as the value of ri that satises
R ri
pi
(ri  p)dFi(p) = si:
Intuitively, ri ; forms an index of the net gains from searching a given rm i and can
be understood as the level of a (ctitious) previously discovered price at which a costly-
shopper would view the marginal benet of searching rm i,
R ri
pi
(ri   p)dFi(p); as equal
to its marginal cost, si: While a rms reservation price is increasing in its search cost,
there is no necessary relationship between a rms reservation price and its expected price.
Instead, reservation prices may be ranked in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance,
such that ri  rj if Fi(p)  Fj(p) 8p and si = sj : Lemma 1 is presented for the general
case of n rms.
Lemma 1. Given the rms search costs, si; and correct conjectures about the rms
pricing distributions, Fi(p); 8i = 1; :::n; the costly-shoppersoptimal search strategy em-
ploys the following three rules, where the reservation price of rm i, ri ; is the value of ri
that satises
R ri
pi
(ri   p)dFi(p) = si:
Start Rule: Start search only when the outside option price of V is higher than (or
equal to) the lowest reservation price, minfr1 ; :::rng.
Selection Rule: If a rm is to be searched, it should be the unsearched rm with the
lowest reservation price.
Stopping Rule: Continue to search only when i) all previously discovered prices and
ii) the outside option price of V are higher than (or equal to) the lowest reservation price
from the remaining unsearched rms. Otherwise stop and buy at current rm, provided
p  V:
Proof. See Weitzman (1979).
Lemma 1 suggests that the costly-shoppers optimal search strategy is surprisingly
simple. For the standard symmetric case, where ri = r
 8i; the optimal strategy col-
lapses into the familiar result - costly-shoppers should begin search only if the common
reservation price is lower than (or equal to) their valuation, V , select any rm to search at
random and stop searching and buy only on the discovery of a price lower than (or equal
to) the common reservation price, r; and their valuation, V: For the asymmetric case,
Weitzmans logic implies that a costly-shopper should now begin search only if the lowest
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reservation price is lower than (or equal to) their valuation V; select the rms to search in
order of ascending reservation prices and stop searching and buy if a price is found that is
lower than (or equal to) all the reservation prices of the remaining unsearched rms and
their valuation, V:
In most cases within the current two rm context, it will later be shown thatminfr1 ; r2g 
V is true in equilibrium such that the costly-shoppers are willing to make a rst search.
Lemma 1 then implies that they will strictly prefer to rst search rm i i¤ ri < r

j , be
indi¤erent between rst searching rm i and rm j i¤ ri = r

j , and strictly prefer to stop
searching and buy after rst searching rm i; when pi < rj ; V:
3.2. Optimal Pricing Strategies. Having established the consumersoptimal strate-
gies, the analysis of Stage 2 is now completed by characterising the rmsoptimal pricing
strategies for an exogenous level of search costs. It is well known that the existence of an
atom of shoppers will provide the incentive for rms to deviate from any pure strategy
pricing equilibrium (e.g. Varian 1980, Proposition 2) and equilibrium pricing strategies
are allowed to be in the form of price distributions. In particular, any Stage 2 Nash
equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions: given the behaviour of all other play-
ers, i) all consumerssearch strategies must be optimal, ii) each rm must strictly prefer
prices within its equilibrium support and expect to receive constant equilibrium prots
over all such prices, E(i) = i 8pi 2 [pi; pi] 8i and E(i) < i 8pi =2 [pi; pi] 8i, iii) each
rms equilibrium pricing distribution must be well behaved, Fi(pi) = 0, Fi(pi) = 1 and
F 0i (p)  0, 8pi 2 [pi; pi] 8i; and iv) consumers must hold correct conjectures about each
rms pricing distribution.
For what follows, dene the fraction of costly-shoppers that optimally choose to rst
search rm i as i 2 [0; ] for i = 1; 2; such that 1 +2  : Without loss of generality,
Proposition 1 focuses on the case where s1  s2:
Proposition 1. For any 0  s1  s2; any Stage 2 equilibrium must be described by the
following8
8With the following caveat: when 1 = 

2; the expressions for F1(p) and F2(p) are dened over
p 2 [p1; p1] rather than p 2 [p1; p1):
Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation 9
F1(p) = 1 

(2+)p1
p   

2


p 2 [p1; p1)
f1(p1) =

1   2
1 + 

F2(p) = 1 

(1+)p1
p   

1


p 2 [p1; p1)
p1 =

1
1+

p1; p1 = minfr2 ; V g
1 = 

1p1; 2 = (

2 + )p1
where ri is the value of ri such that
R ri
pi
(ri   p)dFi(p) = si, which for Firm 2, yields,
r2 =

s2
 + 1 ln(

1=(

1 + ))

where the unique values of f1; 2g are given by the following when s1 2 (0; ((1 )+
 ln)V ];
1 =
s2 s1
s1+s2
; 2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
if s2 2 [s1; (s1=))
1 = ; 

2 = 0 if s2  s1=
and where the values of f1; 2g in any equilibrium must be such that
1 + 

2 =  if s2 = s1 = 0
1  s2 s1s1+s2 ; 2 
s1 s2
s1+s2
if s2 2 [s1; (s1=)) and s1 > ((1  ) +  ln)V
1  ; 2 = 0 if s2  s1= and s1 > ((1  ) +  ln)V
Proof. See Appendix.
Figures 1 and 2 present a graphical representation of Proposition 1 for s2  s1, holding
constant s1 2 (0; ((1 ) + ln)V ]9 . Figure 1 illustrates the initial search behaviour of
the costly-shoppers in equilibrium and Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium price distribu-
tions10 . As explained in more detail below, when s2 = s1; the costly-shoppers optimally
rst search the rms in equal proportions, 1 = 

2 = (=2); and the rms employ identi-
cal price distributions. However as s2 increases, the costly-shoppers choose to rst search
9Figures 1 and 2 use a set of example parameters, s1 = 1; V = 10 and  =  = 0:5.
10The equilibrium price distributions are related to Narasimhan (1988) which considers 1 and 

2 as
exogenous under the special case s1 = s2 =1:
Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation 10
Firm 1 (Firm 2) in larger (smaller) proportions until the point when s2  (s1=), where
all the costly-shoppers rst search Firm 1, 1 = : Increases in s2 also prompt both rms
price distributions to increase in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance (until p1
reaches its maximum, V ): Moreover, such increases allow Firm 1 to earn higher prots
and select a higherprice distribution than Firm 2, with positive mass at the upper price
bound, p1:
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.
First consider the symmetric case with s2 = s1 2 (0; ((1 )+ ln)V ], and suppose
1 = 

2 = (=2): As rst demonstrated by Janssen et al (2005)
11 , there then exists
an equilibrium where the two rms use an identical pricing distribution, F1(p) = F2(p);
with identical associated reservation prices, r1 = r

2 > 0; and earn identical equilibrium
prots, 1 = 2: In setting pi = minfrj ; V g; Firm i can guarantee an equilibrium prot,
i = (=2)pi; by ensuring that its share of costly-shoppers nd it optimal to buy without
making a second search: However, the existence of an atom of shoppers presents each
rm with the incentive to undercut its rival until the lower price bound, pi = (=(1 +
))pi, below which, each rm would prefer to price at pi. The identical equilibrium
pricing distributions balance these incentives by making each rm indi¤erent over the price
support, [p1; p1]: For 

1 = 

2 = (=2) to be consistent with the costly-shoppersoptimal
behaviour, the costly-shoppers must be willing to make a rst search and indi¤erent
between rst searching Firm 1 and Firm 2. From Lemma 1, this requires r1 = r

2  V
to be true in equilibrium. From above, we know r1 = r

2 holds and r

1 = r

2  V can
be shown to be satised when the level of search costs is su¢ ciently low, s1  ((1  
)+ ln)V: Although not shown by Janssen et al, Proposition 1 also demonstrates that
this equilibrium is unique as any other division of costly-shoppers must be inconsistent
in equilibrium. For example, if instead i > 

j ; then Fj(p) > Fi(p) 8p 2 (p1; p1); such
that ri > r

j and the costly-shoppers would all rather rst search rm j. Further, if
i = 

j < (=2), then r

1 = r

2 < V; such that all costly-shoppers would strictly prefer
to make a rst search. Finally, note the special case when s2 = s1 = 0; where Bertrand
competition always ensures zero prices and prots in equilibrium, i = p1 = p1 = 0: Here,
11 In standard search models, consumers are assumed to make their rst search for free. Janssen et al
(2005) rst departed from this assumption, but focussed on the case where search costs were exogenous
and symmetric across rms.
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due to the presence of the shoppers, any division of costly-shoppers is consistent with
equilibrium provided 1 + 

2 = ; because si = pi = r

i = 0 < V 8i for any value of
f1; 2g.
Second, consider the case where s2 is signicantly larger than s1; with s2  (s1=) and
s1 2 (0; ((1 )+ ln)V ]: Suppose 1 =  and 2 = 0: In setting p1 = minfr2 ; V g; Firm
1 can guarantee an equilibrium prot, 1 = p1; by ensuring that the costly-shoppers nd
it optimal to buy without further searching Firm 2: Without any rst searches from the
costly-shoppers, Firm 2 can only gain prots by competing for the shoppers. Consequently,
p2  p1 is dominated. Firm 1 is willing to compete by lowering its price until a lower
price bound, p1 = p1; below which it would prefer to price at p1: Firm 2 will then never
optimally price below p1. The equilibrium pricing distributions make each rm indi¤erent
over their respective price supports, p1 2 [p1; p1] and p2 2 [p1; p1); and are asymmetric as
shown in the right-hand case of Figure 2: Further, it must be true that 2 = p1, as Firm
2 can always ensure the custom of the shoppers by pricing at p1: This implies 2 < 1:
For 1 =  and 

2 = 0 to be consistent with the costly-shoppersoptimal behaviour,
the costly-shoppers must be willing to rst search Firm 1 . From Lemma 1, this requires
r1  r2 and r1  V to be true in equilibrium. Despite Firm 1s higher prices, one can show
that r1  r2 is true in equilibrium if Firm 2s search cost is su¢ ciently large, s2  (s1=);
and that r1  V if s1  ((1 ) + ln)V: Once more, this equilibrium is unique as any
other division of costly-shoppers would be inconsistent with equilibrium.
Third, consider the case with intermediate value of s2; with s2 2 (s1; (s1=)) and
s1 2 (0; ((1   ) +  ln)V: Suppose 1 = s2 s1s1+s2 and 2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
; which as displayed
in Figure 1, implies 1 2 ((=2); ); 2 = (0; (=2)) and 1 + 2 = : The resulting
equilibrium price distributions follow a similar logic to the case above. In setting p1 =
minfr2 ; V g; Firm 1 can guarantee an equilibrium prot of 1 = 1p1 by ensuring that its
share of costly-shoppers nd it optimal to buy without further searching Firm 2: Again,
although Firm 2 receives some costly-shoppers, it always wishes to undercut Firm 1. Firm
1 will compete until a lower bound, p1 = (1=(

1+))p1; and the subsequent equilibrium
distributions on p1 2 [p1; p1] and p2 2 [p1; p1) are asymmetric as shown in the middle-case
of Figure 2: Firm 2 can guarantee 2 = (2 + )p1 < 1 by pricing at p1 to ensure the
custom of the shoppers and its share of costly-shoppers: For 1 =
s2 s1
s1+s2
and 2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
to be consistent with the costly-shoppersoptimal behaviour, the costly-shoppers must
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be willing to make a rst search and be indi¤erent between rst searching Firm 1 and
Firm 2. From Lemma 1, this requires r1 = r

2  V to be true in equilibrium. Despite
Firm 1s higher prices, one can show that r1 = r

2 is true in equilibrium if Firm 2s
search cost is relatively larger than Firm 1s, s2 2 (s1; (s1=)]; and that r1 = r2  V if
s1  ((1  ) +  ln)V: As above, the division of costly-shoppers is unique.
Finally, in the remaining cases where s1  s2 but s1 > ((1  ) +  ln)V , one need
only show that the initial search decisions must be bounded by those found previously for
the case when s1 is smaller. In the symmetric case, s1 = s2; the full participation of the
costly-shoppers (1 + 

2 = ) can no longer be supported as this would imply, r

i > V;
such that search would no longer be optimal. Neither, can 1+

2 = 0 be optimal (unless
s1 = s2  V ) as then equilibrium prices would be zero and the costly-shoppers would wish
to search. Instead, as shown in Janssen et al (2005, Proposition 2), the equilibrium must
involve partial participation with the costly-shoppers mixing between searching and not
participating in order to lower equilibrium prices to the point where ri (1; 2) = V for
i = 1; 2: Similarly, in the asymmetric cases, some non-participation is necessary to ensure
prices are low enough to allow the costly-shoppers to be indi¤erent over entering the
market in equilibrium. The exact level of participation is di¢ cult to present analytically
due to lack of an explicit expression for Firm 1s reservation price.
It is interesting to note that the relationship between the order of search and equi-
librium prices remains contested within the literature. Consistent with our results, Ar-
batskaya (2007) demonstrates that prices are declining in (an exogenous) search order
within a homogenous goods market where consumerssearch costs are distributed with
an atomless distribution, but where each consumer faces the same search cost for each
rm. Other papers have shown that this relationship may be reversed. For example,
Armstrong et al (2009) show that prices can be increasing in (an exogenous) search order
if the rms exhibit random product di¤erentiation. This results from the fact that the
residual demand of the rst searched rm can be more elastic than its rivalsdue to a
higher composition of freshconsumers that have yet to search the entire market.
4. Stage 1 Analysis
This section now examines the rmsequilibrium choice of search costs. For convenience,
we will maintain the notational assumption that s1  s2: It will also be useful to dene
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s2 = [1+(=) ln]V > 0 as the value of s2 that produces an equilibrium value of r2 = V ,
provided the value of s1 is such that 1 = : Firm 2 will then be said to fully obfuscate
if it sets s2  s2 such that r2  V , because the costly-shoppers will then never face a
strict incentive to search it. Proposition 2 now provides the main result of the paper.
Proposition 2. There exists no equilibrium with full transparency, where s1 = s2 = 0:
Instead, there exists an innite number of outcome-equivalent asymmetric equilibria where
one rm, say Firm 2, fully obfuscates with s2  s2 = [1 + (=) ln]V > 0 and where
its rival does not obfuscate, with s1 = 0: Relative to no obfuscation, these equilibria yield
larger prots for both rms and lower surplus for both types of consumers.
Proof. See Appendix.
Contrary to initial intuition, Proposition 2 demonstrates that competition may not
be enough to ensure market transparency. Even when rms are presented with a costless
opportunity to improve consumersinformation, the market equilibria involve imperfect
information provision. In particular, Proposition 2 suggests that information provision will
be asymmetric, with one rm always choosing to fully obfuscate by deliberately increasing
its cost of being searched12 .
To gain an understanding for this result, rst note that if neither rm obfuscates, the
costly-shoppers can identify both prices costlessly and Bertrand competition ensures that
both rms earn zero prots. Now imagine an increase in Firm 2s search costs, holding
constant s1 = 0: This increases r2 and reduces the willingness of the costly-shoppers to
visit Firm 2, providing two e¤ects: i) rather than being indi¤erent between rst searching
Firm 1 and Firm 2, now all the costly-shoppers strictly prefer to rst search Firm 1,
1 = ; because r

1 < r

2 for all s2 > 0 = s1 = (s1=); and ii) the costly-shoppers become
more willing to buy at Firm 1 without further search, allowing Firm 1 to increase its prices,
as p1 = minfr2 ; V g: This second e¤ect continues until the point s2 = s2, where r2 = V
and where Firm 2 is said to fully obfuscate. At such a point, Firm 1 is able to maintain
the custom of all the costly-shoppers even at p1 = p1 = V , to earn 1 = V: This provides
Firm 1 with a very weak incentive to lower its price and thereby furnishes Firm 2 with
12A further equilibrium where the rms randomise between si = 0 and si  s2 may also exist, but it
is clear that the associated prots will be weakly dominated by the prots gained within the asymmetric
pure strategy equilibria.
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a level of market power over the shoppers who remain willing to search due to their low
cost of time13 . Specically, Firm 2 can guarantee equilibrium prots, 2 = p1 = V; by
pricing at p1 = V: Consequently, the subsequent pricing equilibrium prompts both rms
to use positive prices, but allows Firm 1 to set probabilistically higher prices than Firm 2,
with F2(p)  F1(p) 8p: Further increases in s2 above s2 have no e¤ect on equilibrium as
p1 cannot increase beyond V and so 1 = V > 2 = V > 0 for all s2  s2 such that
Firm 2 strictly prefers to break the no-obfuscation outcome by fully obfuscating14 . This
reduces both types of consumer surplus, expressed respectively as CSCS = V   E(p1)
and CSS = V   E(minfp2; p1g), because unlike the Bertrand case, prices now become
positive.
Second, consider why the decision by the costly-shoppers to rst search Firm 1 after
obfuscation is consistent with equilibrium. Despite higher expected prices, the costly-
shoppers nd it optimal to rst search Firm 1 due to the o¤setting factor of Firm 1s low
search cost, which ensures r1 = 0 < r

2 ; V:
Third, consider Firm 1s incentives. Firm 1 has no strict incentive to obfuscate in
addition to Firm 2. From Proposition 1, we know that selecting s1 = s2  s2 cannot be
optimal because this would induce 1  V=2 which is lower than the prots earned by
not obfuscating, 1 = V: Further, selecting s1 > s2 cannot be optimal as we know that
the rm with the lower search costs always earns higher prots. Now consider an increase
in s1 such that 0 < s1 < s2: Levels of s1 towards the upper end of this range could act
to reduce demand and prots by pushing r1 beyond V and deterring the costly-shoppers
from making an initial search, and even if the increase in s1 was smaller such that costly-
shopper participation was maintained, prots would only remain unchanged15 . Note also,
that Firm 1 has no incentive to counter Firm 2s obfuscation strategy by perhaps, helping
to inform the costly-shoppers of Firm 2s location and price, because the resulting softer
13Within the current assumptions, this is trivial as the shoppers have a zero cost of time. More generally,
the incentives to obfuscate can remain as long as some non-zero proportion of shoppers are still willing
to search Firm 2.
14 If practical or cost constraints generate some limit to the level of obfuscation, bs2 2 (0; s2); then it
follows that Firm 2 will simply select s2 = bs2. Prices and prots will strictly increase but by an amount
less than under full obfuscation.
15This leads to the possibility of other equilibria where Firm 2 fully obfuscates and where Firm 1
obfuscates by some small amount. Such equilibria would be outcome-equivalent to those described in
Proposition 1 in terms of prices and prots and would only involve lower levels of costly-shopper welfare.
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price competition strictly increases Firm 1s prots. This reason di¤ers from Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) where the rival rm has no incentive to inform the myopic consumers of
the obfuscating rms concealed add-on price because, even when informed, the consumers
would still prefer to buy from the obfuscating rm in order to obtain a lower base price,
while substituting away from the add-on.
A further overall intuition for Proposition 2 can be gained by considering the role of
the shoppers. The existence of the shoppers is potentially damaging for industry prots
because they generate the incentives for rms to engage in tougher price competition16 .
Here however, obfuscation by an individual rm can minimise this damage by sorting
the consumer types across the two rms, such that its rival has a reduced incentive to
compete. This logic is very similar to the mechanism that underlies standard results in
vertical product di¤erentiation (Shaked and Sutton 1982). In parallel, if consumers vary
in their taste for high quality (or costs of time), a duopolist may be able to prot from
choosing a lower level of quality (or higher level of search costs) than its rival.
5. Robustness
This section investigates the robustness of the results with regard to a number of factors:
the possibility of a minimum, natural level of search costs, more than two rms, an
imperfect ability of consumers to assess search costs and a situation where rms are
unable to commit to an obfuscation strategy. By doing so, the section also highlights how
the paper di¤ers to Ellison and Wolitsky (2008).
5.1. Minimum market frictions. In contrast to the previous section, the natural
level of search costs, absent obfuscation, is unlikely to be zero in some markets. This
subsection presents a more general case by assuming that rms cannot choose search
costs below some minimum level, si  m where m 2 [0; V ]: In addition to providing a
comparison to Ellison and Wolitsky (2008) which assumesm > 0, this extension also o¤ers
a useful platform for the oligopoly analysis below. Proposition 3 conrms the logic and
results of Proposition 2 by suggesting that one rm always has the incentive to add to the
16Ellisons (2005) analysis of obfuscation in markets with add-ons demonstrates that rms can use
the existence of shoppers (or low types in his model) to actually increase prots by creating an adverse
selection e¤ect that deters price cuts.
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natural level of search costs; provided Condition A holds. Condition A ensures the full
participation of the costly-shoppers is optimal in equilibrium when s1 = m, and is likely
to be satised when the fraction of costly-shoppers, ; is relatively small or when the
natural level of search costs, m; is low relative to V (see Figure 3). It is always satised
when m = 017 .
(m=V ) < (1  ) +  ln (Condition A)
Insert Figure 3 here.
Proposition 3. When Condition A holds, there exists no game equilibrium with full
transparency, where s1 = s2 = m: Instead, there exists an innite number of outcome-
equivalent asymmetric equilibria where one rm, say Firm 2, fully obfuscates with s2 
s2 = [1 + (=) ln]V > m and where its rival does not obfuscate, with s1 = m:
Proof. See Appendix.
5.2. More than two rms. This subsection shows that the incentives for individual
obfuscation can also remain in markets with a larger number of rms. Rather than taking
the approach of previous results, we simply aim to characterise a set of parameters where
obfuscation must form part of equilibrium behaviour. Specically, a set of parameters is
considered where a rm can protability deviate from the no-obfuscation outcome while
still ensuring the full participation of the costly-shoppers.
Proposition 4. The region of parameters where any equilibrium must involve obfusca-
tion is non-empty for any nite number of rms if m > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
With a similar logic to the duopoly case, Proposition 4 demonstrates the incentives for
a rm to obfuscate in order to reduce its rivalswillingness to compete for the shoppers and
increase their equilibrium prices. Unlike the duopoly case however, where obfuscation was
17An equilibrium analysis outside Condition A is di¢ cult due to the intractability problems caused by
partial costly-shopper participation.
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always protable when the natural level of search costs,m; was zero, protable obfuscation
now requires m > 0. Intuitively, if m = 0 when n > 2 any individual increase in search
costs is unable to raise prices because the remaining rms are still left to engage in
Bertrand competition with each other. The same logic also rules out the protability of
obfuscation when n = 1; as highlighted below. This results contrasts with Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) where all rms optimally obfuscate in equilibrium by concealing their add-
on prices, regardless of the market structure. The di¤erence arises because obfuscation
does not rely on softening competition in their model. Instead, it acts to deceive myopic
consumers in a way that is then used to compete more aggressively for sophisticated
consumers.
Corollary 1. There is no strict incentive to obfuscate when n =1:
It is di¢ cult to nd further analytical results concerning the protability of obfus-
cation and the number of competitors. However, simulations suggest that the region of
parameters where a rm can protability obfuscate while ensuring the full participation of
the costly-shoppers appears to shrink as the number of competitors increases, (see Figure
4 in the appendix). This provides a very tentative suggestion that increases in the number
of competitors might reduce the level of equilibrium search costs18 . Future work aims to
further investigate this issue.
5.3. Imperfect observability. Contrary to the base model, there may be circum-
stances where consumers are not aware of the value of si until after searching rm i. In
such cases, as considered by Ellison and Wolitzky (2008), consumers must view the rms
as ex ante identical such that search order is no longer an important issue. This subsec-
tion now demonstrates that the incentive to obfuscate can remain in our model even when
consumers observe rmssearch costs imperfectly.
In particular, we consider equilibria where consumers can assess the market distribu-
tion of actual search costs, fsi; sjg; but are unable to observe the exact search cost of any
18 Intuitively, this pattern derives from a well known feature of the Stahl (1989) model that shows that
an increase in the number of competitors actually increases equilibrium prices because a price cut becomes
less likely to win the custom of the shoppers. Thus, when n is larger, obfuscation is more likely to raise
prices beyond the point where the full participation of the costly-shoppers is optimal.
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individual rm until after searching19 . Imagine Firm 2 marginally increases its search cost
to " > 0, holding s1 = 0: Costly-shoppers are only aware of fsi; sjg = f"; 0g such that
rmsreservation prices remain unobservable. Therefore, provided their product valua-
tion is large enough to ensure market participation, the costly-shoppers can do no better
than randomising over their rst search destinations, 1 + 

2 = (=2). By doing so, the
costly-shoppers learn the price and search cost of their visited rm and are able to infer
the search cost of the remaining rm. As a result, the costly-shoppers that visited Firm
2 always face a weak incentive to become fully informed as they realise that they can
further search Firm 1 at no extra cost. However, the costly-shoppers that rst searched
Firm 1 now infer that s2 = " and are reluctant to make a further search: Following a
similar intuition to Proposition 2, this provides Firm 1 with the ability to raise prices and
weakens its incentive to compete for the remaining consumers, which then allows Firm 2
to also earn positive prots. Proposition 5 follows.
Proposition 5. There exists no equilibrium with full transparency, s1 = s2 = 0, even
when search costs are imperfectly observable.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.4. The role of commitment. In many circumstances, where obfuscation is in the
form of a longer-run decision variable such as location or some forms of advertising,
the assumption that rms can commit to an obfuscation strategy seems reasonable. This
subsection now investigates whether our results can extend to alternative market scenarios
where rms do not have such an ability. Consider a game without commitment where
each rm selects its price and search cost simultaneously in Stage 1, before consumers
observe the level of each rms search costs and make their search decisions in Stage 2.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the ability to commit is a crucial assumption within our
paper, and forms the key di¤erence to Ellison and Wolitzky (2008).
Proposition 6. Without pre-commitment, there exists a no-obfuscation equilibrium where
s1 = s2 = p1 = p2 = 0:
19This assumption is stronger than Ellison and Wolitzky. They assume consumers can only make
conjectures about the distribution of search costs which are correct in equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Without an ability to commit to a level of search costs, obfuscation cannot break
the Bertrand equilibrium. Any attempt by an individual rm to protably obfuscate by
increasing its search costs and price will fail to induce an increase in rival prices and
simply prompt all consumers to search and buy elsewhere.
However, Ellison and Wolitzky (2008) show how two obfuscation mechanisms can
exist in such a setting if one makes some additional assumptions. In a framework where
consumers are unable to observe rms search costs such that the costly-shoppers are
willing to randomise over their initial search destinations, Ellison and Wolitzky show
the existence of symmetric equilibria where all rms obfuscate with positive probability.
Under both mechanisms, the incentive to obfuscate arises through its e¤ect on inating
the costly-shoppers (expected) cost of a second search, such that an obfuscating rm
can protably increase its price (distribution) while maintaining the trade of its share of
costly-shoppers. The rst mechanism assumes that a consumers total cost of search, g(s),
is strictly convex in the time spent searching, rather than our implicit linear assumption,
g(s) = s. Consequently, provided the costly-shoppers nd it optimal to make a rst search
and that sj  m > 0; an increase si can increase the marginal cost of a second search,
g(si+sj) g(si) > 0: The second mechanism assumes that search costs are uncertain due to
the existence of a common shock across all rms, , which is unobservable to both rms and
consumers. Firm i can then make the (expected) cost of a second search more expensive
by increasing si in order to inate the costly-shoppers estimated value of . Finally,
note that Ellison and Wolitzkys results also di¤er from ours in the relationship between
obfuscation and prices. After introducing costs to obfuscation, their model predicts that
in order to deter further search, rms with a low price realisation can obfuscate less than
rms with a high price realisation. This contrasts to our model where the obfuscating
rm must select lower prices in order to compete e¤ectively for the shoppers.
6. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the incentives to obfuscate in a framework where consumers
can choose not only the number of rms to search, but also the order in which to search.
Obfuscation by an individual rm can protably induce consumers with high costs of time
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to search to rst search the rms now prominentrival and thereby soften competition
for the remaining consumers.
The papers ndings suggest a government intervention to provide better market infor-
mation would improve competition and enhance consumer welfare. However, it remains
unclear to what extent such an intervention would be necessary. Indeed, while it has been
shown that both an obfuscating rm and its rival benet from obfuscation, future re-
search should aim to better understand the incentives for other market players to counter
obfuscation strategies by improving consumersinformation. First, in our model and in
the literature as a whole, there may be incentives for a third party to sell information to
costly-shoppers. Such incentives relate to the existence of intermediaries or gatekeepers,
as studied by Baye and Morgan (2001). However, as argued in Ellison and Ellison (2009)
any such agent has to avoid the potential paradox of being unable to sell any information
if by doing so, it makes the market perfectly competitive. Second, our model presents
an incentive for the shoppers to inform their fellow consumers of the obfuscating rms
location and price in order to strengthen competition. Future work would be useful in pro-
viding a fuller understanding of the e¤ect of consumerssocial networks on competition.
See Galeoitti (2008) for a start on this issue.
Finally, in the light of behavioural industrial organisation, it is tempting to reinterpret
the model as one in which consumers di¤er in their cognitive ability, rather than in their
costs of time, and where rms obfuscate by making their prices harder to understand,
rather than harder to observe. Such an interpretation of search costs is discussed in
Ellison (2006) but it appears unconvincing in regard to the current model for several
reasons. First, the assumption that search costs are a necessary pre-purchase expenditure
seems less reasonable. Indeed, it might be both possible and rational for a consumer to
buy a product without making the calculations to fully comprehend a price. Second, the
assumption that rms can pre-commit to a level of search costs seems less reasonable as
rms can often modify how a price is presented at negligible cost. Finally, the cognitive
search cost interpretation appears to generate a methodological incompatibility. One
must assume that a consumer must expend some costly resources to merely understand
a price, while maintaining that the consumer can infer all other playersstrategies and
calculate an optimal strategy based on a set of reservation prices with potentially non-
analytical solutions at zero cost. While the topic of spurious market complexity is of
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huge importance, it would appear that more radical revisions to standard search models
are needed for its study. Spieglers (2006) model of obfuscation across multiple product
dimensions when consumers make naive comparisons is an exciting step in this direction.
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7. Appendix:
Proposition 1:
Proof. In a series of steps we rst demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium listed
in Proposition 1 by construction, before demonstrating equilibrium uniqueness for the
case where s1 2 (0; ((1  ) +  ln)V ].
Step 1. It is easy to verify that the proposed pricing distributions are well-behaved,
with Fi(p1) = 0, F 0i (p) > 0 8p 2 [p1; p1) 8i = 1; 2; F2(p1) = 1; and F1(p1) + f1(p1) = 1:
Step 2. In any potential equilibrium with 1  2 dene the following exhaustive
cases: i) 1  2 > 0; ii) 1 > 2 = 0 or iii) 1 = 2 = 0: For such cases to be consistent
with consumersoptimal search strategies, Lemma 1 suggests the following must be true
in equilibrium. (See the text for more explanation). Case i) requires r1 = r

2  V: Case
ii) requires r1  r2 and r1  V: Case iii) requires r1 ; r2 > V; because the costly-shoppers
must strictly prefer to remain out of the market.
Step 3. Knowing this, one can now verify that each rm can do no better than
pricing with its proposed distribution to earn its proposed equilibrium prots, given the
equilibrium behaviour of its rival and the consumers. Noting from Lemma 1, that the
i costly-shoppers that have decided to rst search rm i will only buy without further
search to rm j if pi  minfrj ; V g; one can describe the expected prots of each rm by
the following. (Recall p1 = minfr2 ; V g):
E(1(p)jF2(p)) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > p1
p1[

1 + (1  F2(p))] if p1 2 [p1; p1]
p1[

1 + ] if p1 < p1
E(2(p)jF1(p)) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if p2 > p1
((2 + )=2)f1(p1) if p2 = p1
p2[(

2 + )(1  F1(p))] if p2 2 (minfr1 ; V g; p1)
p2[

2 + (1  F1(p))] if p2 2 [p1;minfr1 ; V g]
p2[

2 + ] if p2 < p1
For Firm 1, it is easy to check that E(1(p)jF2(p)) = 1 = 1p1 for p1 2 [p1; p1] and
E(1(p)jF2(p)) < 1 for p1 =2 [p1; p1]: To perform a similar check for Firm 2 requires us to
consider two cases. First, suppose 2 = 0: Then it follows that E(2(p)jF1(p)) = 2 = p1
Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation 25
for p2 2 [p1; p1) and E(2(p)jF1(p)) < 2 for p2 =2 [p1; p1): Second, suppose 2 > 0.
From Step 2, it must then be true that minfr1 ; V g = minfr2 ; V g = p1: Then it follows
that E(2(p)jF1(p)) = 2 = (2 + )p1 for p2 2 [p1; p1) and E(2(p)jF1(p)) < 2 for
p2 =2 [p1; p1):
Step 4. The equilibrium reservation prices can be constructed by inserting the ap-
propriate equilibrium values into
R ri
pi
(ri   p)dFi(p) = si; or equivalently and more sim-
ply,
R ri
pi
Fi(p)dp = si. Through simplication, this can o¤er an explicit expression for
r2 = s2=( + 

1 ln(

1=(

1 + ))); but not for r

1 :
We now check that the initial search behaviour of the costly-shoppers,f1; 2g is con-
sistent with equilibrium. This is done by considering each scenario in turn.
Step 5a. When s2 2 [s1; (s1=)) and s1 2 (0; ((1   ) +  ln)V ], Proposition 1
suggests 1 =
s2 s1
s1+s2
and 2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
such that 1 + 

2 =  and 

1  2 > 0:
From Step 2, this requires r1 = r

2  V to be true in equilibrium: To check r1 = r2
holds20 , note that F1(p) = F2(p) + (
(2 1)
 ) +

(1 2)p1
p

which, together with the
denition, s2 =
R r2
p1
F2(p)dp, yields s2+
R r2
p1
(
(2 1)
 )+

(1 2)p1
p

dp =
R r2
p1
F1(p)dp: By
decomposing the right-hand side into
R r2
r1
F1(p)dp+
R r1
p1
F1(p)dp =
R r2
r1
F1(p)dp+s1 one can
then obtain
R r2
r1
F1(p)dp = s2

2+
1+

 s1: It then follows that r1 = r2 i¤ s2

2+
1+

= s1:
Further, when 1 + 

2 = , f1; 2g are uniquely determined by 1 = s2 s1s1+s2 and
2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
: For 1 + 

2 =  to be optimal, we require minfr1 ; r2g  V . To show this
is true in equilibrium when s1  ((1   ) +  ln)V , we need only ensure that r2  V
when s2 = (s1=) as one can verify that r2=s2 > 0 8s2 2 (s1; (s1=)]: This then follows
trivially from the fact that 1 =  when s2 = (s1=); such that r

2 = s2=( +  ln):
Step 5b. When s2 2 [s1; (s1=)) and s1 > ((1  ) +  ln)V; Proposition 1 suggests
1  s2 s1s1+s2 and 2 
s1 s2
s1+s2
: From Step 5a, we know that such a level of search costs
may be inconsistent with 1 =
s2 s1
s1+s2
and 2 =
s1 s2
s1+s2
(such that 1 + 

2 = ) in
equilibrium because cases can then exist where r1 = r

2 > V . In such cases, either s1 > V;
such that search can never be optimal and 1 = 

2 = 0 must form part of equilibrium,
or s1 2 (((1   ) +  ln)V; V ]: In this latter case, we know i = 0 cannnot be true
because this would imply ri < V such that search would become optimal. Instead, any
equilibrium must involve a lower level of market participation with costly-shoppers mixing
20 I thank John Vickers for suggesting this step.
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between searching and not participating in order to lower the rmsreservation prices to
a level equal to V:
Step 6a. When s2  (s1=) and s1 2 (0; ((1   ) +  ln)V ], Proposition 1 suggests
1 = ; 

2 = 0: From Step 2, this requires r

1  r2 and r1  V to be true in equilibrium.
To check r1  r2 holds, we know from the result in Step 5a,
R r2
r1
F1(p)dp = s2

2+
1+

 s1;
that r1  r2 i¤ s2

2+
1+

 s1. Further, when 1 = ; it follows that r1  r2 i¤
s2  (s1=): For 1 = , we also require r1  V: To show this is true in equilibrium when
s1  ((1   ) +  ln)V , dene s2 = [1 + (=) ln]V as the value of s2 that generates
r2 = V when 

2 = : It follows that r

1  V for s2 2 ((s1=); s2] as then r2  V: It also
follows for s2 > s2; because r1(s2) = r

1(s2) 8s2  s2 as p1 = V; and r1(s2)  r2(s2) = V
i¤ s2  (s1=); or on rewriting, i¤ s1  ((1  ) +  ln)V:
Step 6b. When s2  (s1=) and s1 > ((1   ) +  ln)V , Proposition 1 suggests
1 < ; 

2 = 0: From Step 6a, we know that such a level of search costs is inconsistent
with 1 =  in equilibrium because this would imply V < r

1  r2 . For s1 > V; clearly
1 = 

2 = 0 is optimal. For s1 2 (((1 )+ ln)V; V ]; we know 1 = 0 cannot be true
in equilibrium this would imply r1 < V such that search would be optimal. Consequently,
any equilibrium must involve a lower level of market participation with the costly-shoppers
mixing between searching Firm 1 with some probability, b1 < ; and not participating,
such that r1(b1) = V:
Step 7. Finally, note the special case when s1 = s2 = 0: Bertrand competition must
ensure that p1 = p1 = 0 is always true in equilibrium regardless of costly-shopper behav-
iour. This implies r1 = r

2 = 0 < V 8f1; 2g such that any costly-shopper division is
consistent with equilibrium, provided 1 + 

2 = :
Step 8. To establish uniqueness when s1 2 (0; ((1 )+ ln)V ], rst note that for any
given fi ; jg; the equilibrium pricing distributions are unique. This follows from Baye et
al (1992) which shows that games of this sort can display a continuum of pricing equilibria
when n > 2, but only a single pricing equilibrium when n = 2: Indeed, one can see that
here by observing that fF1(p); F2(p)g are uniquely determined by E(i(p)jFj(p)) = i
for i = 1; 2 as listed above. Second, in the case when s1 2 (0; ((1   ) +  ln)V ]; note
from above that the values of f1; 2g that are consistent with the pricing equilibrium
are uniquely determined for any si  sj : Finally, when s1 = s2 = 0; although the costly-
shopper division in not unique, the zero pricing equilibrium is; such that all agentspayo¤s
Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation 27
are uniquely determined.
Proposition 2. There exists no equilibrium with full transparency, where s1 = s2 = 0:
Instead, there exists an innite number of outcome-equivalent asymmetric equilibria where
one rm, say Firm 2, fully obfuscates with s2  s2 = [1 + (=) ln]V > 0 and where
its rival does not obfuscate, with s1 = 0: Relative to no obfuscation, these equilibria yield
larger prots for both rms and lower surplus for both types of consumers.
Proof. Given s1 = 0, Firm 2s equilibrium prots, 2 = (2 + )p1 can be expanded
to 2 = (2 + )(
1
1+
) min

s2
+1 ln(

1=(

1+))
; V

by using the results of Proposition
1. By noting that i) 2 = 0 when s2 = 0 and ii) 1 = ; 

2 = 0 for all s2 > (s1=) = 0;
Firm 2s prots can be further displayed as follows.
2(s2js1 = 0) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if s2 = 0
2s2
+ ln

if s2 2 (0; s2)
V if s2  s2
One can rst observe that s1 = s2 = 0 can never be an equilibrium because Firm 2 can
earn strictly positive prots by selecting s2 > 0: To show that there exists a continuum
of equilibria with s1 = 0 and s2  s2 note that 2(s2js1 = 0) is strictly increasing in
s2 2 (0; s2]. Further, Firm 2 will prefer to fully obfuscate by setting any s2  s2 rather
than setting s2 = 0 as 2(s2  s2js1 = 0) > 0. Given s2  s2; we know that s1 = 0 is a
best response for Firm 1 as it is weakly dominant to set s1 2 [0; ((1   ) +  ln)V ] in
order to earn 1 = 1p1 = V: This follows from Proposition 1 which suggests that full
participation cannot be sustained for s1 > (((1 )+ ln)V . Specically, given s2  s2;
1(s1 = s2)  V=2, ii) 1(s1 > s2)  V and iii) 1(s1 2 (((1 )+ ln)V; s2))  V .
Across the continuum, the equilibria are outcome-equivalent because we know that the
equilibrium price distributions are independent of s2  s2; and so are the payo¤s for the
rms, the costly-shoppers and the shoppers, denoted respectively as 1 = V; 2 = V;
CSCS = V E(p1) and CSS = V E(minfp2; p1g): Finally, both rms earn prots that are
strictly larger than those obtainable under a no-obfuscation outcome, as V > V > 0;
and both consumer types earn lower expected surplus. This last point follows as one
can still use the same expressions for consumer surplus for the no-obfuscation outcome
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and then show that contrary to the no-obfuscation equilibrium, full obfuscation generates
p1 = V > 0:
Proposition 3: When Condition A holds, there exists no game equilibrium with full
transparency, where s1 = s2 = m: Instead, there exists an innite number of outcome-
equivalent asymmetric equilibria where one rm, say Firm 2, fully obfuscates with s2 
s2 = [1 + (=) ln]V > m and where its rival does not obfuscate, with s1 = m:
Proof. Condition A implies m = s1 < ((1  ) +  ln)V such that full participation
is guaranteed, 1 + 

2 =  8s2: Condition A also ensures that s2 > (s1=); such that
1 =  is consistent with equilibrium when s2  s2: The proof can then proceed with
the same series of steps as Proposition 2, with the following modications due to the fact
that it may no longer be true that s1 = (s1=) = m = 0. Given s1 = m; Firm 2s prots
can now be expressed as below. Full obfuscation is a best response as prots are strictly
increasing in s2 2 (m; s2] and 2(s2  s2) > 2(s2 = m): The surplus of the costly-
shoppers is now CSCS = V  m  E(p1) for s2 = m or s2  s2: Obfuscation then lowers
both forms of consumer surplus because one can show that the symmetric no-obfuscation
price distribution is stochastically dominated by the price distributions of both rms in
the obfuscation equilibria, F (p)  F2(p)  F1(p):
2(s2js1 = m) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
m
2+ ln( 1+ )
if s2 = m
s1(s2 s1)
(s1+s2)+(s2 s1) ln

s2 s1
s2(1+)
 if s2 2 (m; (m=)]
2s2
+ ln

if s2 2 ((m=); s2)
V if s2  s2
Proposition 4. The region of parameters where any equilibrium must involve obfus-
cation is non-empty for any nite number of rms.
Proof. First we show that there can exist no game equilibrium with si = m 8i =
f1; :::ng when Conditions B and C hold. Dene Condition B asB = 1 R 1
0
dy
1+((1 )=)nyn 1 
(n 1) (n 2)
n(1 )

[1 + ( 1n 2 )(   (n   1) 1=(n 1)] > 0 and Condition C as 0 < (m=V ) 
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[1 + ( 1n 2 )(   (n   1) 1=(n 1))] where  = =((n   1)   (n   2)): In the symmet-
ric case, when si = m 8i = f1; :::ng; Janssen et al (2005) establish that individual
rm prots are no larger than i = (=n)(s=(1  
R 1
0
dy
1+((1 )=)nyn 1 )): Now consider
a deviation by rm n such that sn > V and sa = m for a = f1; 2; :::n   1g: If i)
ra  V and ii) ra < rn, then a = =(n   1) and n = 0 must be consistent with
optimal costly-shopper behaviour: It then follows from the logic of Proposition 1 that
a = (=(n   1))pa, with pa = minfrn; ra; V g = ra; and n = pa; where pa =  ra:
One can then note that Fa(p) = 1   (pa=p)1=(n 1) and by using
R ra
pa
Fa(p)dp = m,
ra = (m=[1 + (
1
n 2 )(   (n   1) 1=(n 1))]. The Conditions then ensure that the de-
viation is protable (Condition B together with 0 < (m=V )) and that the assumption of
ra  V still holds (the latter part of Condition C). It follows trivially that ra < rn: Given
a su¢ ciently small, but positive level of , Conditions B and C then require (n 1)=n < 1
and 0 < (m=V )  1; such that Proposition 4 follows.
Proposition 5. There exists no equilibrium with full transparency, s1 = s2 = 0, even
when search costs are imperfectly observable.
Proof. Following the text, one need only demonstrate that 2 > 0 when s1 = 0 and
s2 = " > 0. In any equilibrium (for small enough "), the costly-shoppers can do no
better than dividing their rst searches such that 1 + 

2 = (=2) as r

1 and r

2 remain
unobservable. On visiting Firm 1, half of the costly-shoppers infer s2 = " which implies
r2 > 0: Consequently, Firm 1 can always guarantee a maximin equilibrium prot of
1 = (=2)minfr2 ; V g > 0 and will be unwilling to price below p1 = 1: Firm 2 can then
always price at p2 = p1 to guarantee 2 = (1   (=2))p1 > 0, ensuring that s1 = s2 = 0
cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Without pre-commitment, there exists a no-obfuscation equilibrium
where s1 = s2 = p1 = p2 = 0:
Proof. In such an equilibrium, the costly-shoppers must correctly infer p1 = p2 = 0
and r1 = r

2 = 0 after observing s1 = s2 = 0: The costly-shoppers will then nd it optimal
to make a rst search as minfr1 ; r2g < V and buy without making a second search as
pi  rj = 0; such that i = 0: To rule out any protable deviations from equilibrium,
note that any deviation by rm i, fs0i; p0ig can only be protable if p0i > 0. Given p0i > 0
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the following will be true for any s0i; holding sj = pj = 0 constant: i) all shoppers will
buy from rm j; ii) any costly-shoppers that rst visit rm j will continue to buy without
further search and iii) any costly-shoppers that rst visit rm i will make a second search
and buy from rm j as p0i > r

j = pj = 0, such that i(p
0
i > 0) = 0:
Figure 1: Equilibrium initial search behaviour to Firm 1 (top), 1; and Firm 2, 

2; where
 = 0:5 and s1 = 1 such that s1= = 2
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Price Distributions: Fi(p) when s2 = s1 (left); F2(p) and F1(p)
when s2 = 0:75(s1=) > s1 (second from left and middle); F2(p) and F1(p) when s2 
(s1=) (second from right and right)
Figure 3: Condition A
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Figure 4: Simulations of Conditions B and C for n = 3 (top); 10; 20; 50 and 200
